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Abstract
Empirical ﬁndings may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation in at least
two ways. First — within criticism — they may help us to identify
the aesthetic value of objects. Second— whithin philosophy — they
may help us to decide which theory of aesthetic value and evalua-
tion to prefer. In this paper, I address both kinds of relevance. My
focus is thereby on empirical evidence gathered, not by means of
ﬁrst-personal experiences, but by means of third-personal scientiﬁc
investigations of individual artworks or, more generally, our interac-
tion with art. The main thesis to be defended is that third-personal
empirical ﬁndings are of limited signiﬁcance for both critical and
philosophical aesthetics. Indeed, they matter only to the extent to
which they draw our attention to features or facts that we then iden-
tify, from our ﬁrst-personal perspective, as aesthetically relevant —
for instance, as reasons counting for or against certain ascriptions
of aesthetic value, or as factors that causally inﬂuence our actual as-
sessments and thus render them partly inadequate or irrational. This
limited signiﬁcance of empirical ﬁndings is in line with the rational-
ist approach to the formation and justiﬁcation of aesthetic judge-
ments, that I have already started to defend elsewhere.
With respect to critical aesthetics, one problem is that empirical
investigations cannot capture the normativity of the aesthetic rel-
evance of lower-level features or facts: the respective studies can
tell us what we take to be reason-giving or valuable, but not what
is reason-giving or valuable. Furthermore, we cannot use empiri-
cally knowable principles to infer the presence of aesthetic values
or reasons on the basis of recognising measurable lower-level fea-
tures because the only available principles are too speciﬁc to allow
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for their actual application to more than one existing object, or even
for their actual formulation. For their antecedents make reference to
a large number of very determinate properties, as well as sometimes
to particular events of creation. The only exception are conceptual
principles (such as ‘something symmetrical is balanced’) or default
principles (such as ‘something elegant is, by default, beautiful’). But
knowledge of these principles is of little inferential use due to the
holistic character of the justiﬁcatory power of aesthetic reasons and,
moreover, does not allow for empirical acquisition.
With respect to philosophical aesthetics, I start with considering the
limits of evolutionary accounts of aesthetic value. Even if it is true
that humans originally came to value artworks because they recog-
nised that artworks reveal certain skills or features of artists (such
as imaginativeness or resourcefulness) that are desirable in sexual
partners, it does not value that our reasons for valuing art have not
changed, or at least not become much more complex. In addition,
the answer to the question of why we value art from an evolutionary
perspective has no obvious bearing on the issue of how we should ap-
preciate art from an aesthetic perspective, or what such aesthetic ap-
preciation would consist in. On the other hand, experimental stud-
ies showing that our actual aesthetic evaluations are inﬂuenced by
factors (such as exposure effects, or knowledge of the prices of ob-
jects), that undermine the good standing of our responses, just reveal
that it is more difficult than perhaps expected to form sound aes-
thetic judgements; and that we need to improve our future aesthetic
judgements by diminishing as much as possible the impact of those
factors.
1. Introduction
Engaging in philosophical aesthetics means, to a considerable extent, also
engaging in other and, in some sense, more fundamental disciplines of phi-
losophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology or the philosophy of mind.1
Which ontological category paintings, novels or performances of music
1 It is interesting to ask whether there is also a general philosophy of normativity (e.g.,
of norms, reasons and values), which should then be included in this list. I am inclinded
to a positive answer, but such a general approach to normative phenomena has not really
fully established itself yet — most debates focus on particular kinds of normative features,
such epistemic or moral ones.
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belong to should be inﬂuenced by considerations about their status as art-
works and about our aesthetic experiences of them. But it is, ultimately,
a metaphysical question, to be answered before the background of a well-
developed metaphysical theory. The same is true of, say, pictorial expe-
riences, or our emotional or imaginative responses to ﬁction. Without a
proper theory of visual experience, emotion or imagination, it is not pos-
sible to fully account for these elements of aesthetic appreciation.
In so far as empirical investigations are relevant for certain issues in
metaphysics, epistemology or the philosophy of mind, they are also rele-
vant for the respective parts of aesthetics which contain those issues. The
relevance is perhaps not the same since additional ‘aesthetic considera-
tions’ — that is, considerations distinctive of aesthetics as a philosophical
discipline — may heighten or weaken the importance of the empirical re-
sults concerned. But even if the latter turn out to be irrelevant in certain
cases, this fact needs to be established by aesthetics. Hence, if (and this
antecendent is by no means obviously satisﬁed) certain empirical studies
or insights are indeed relevant for a satisfactory theory of a certain men-
tal phenomenon, then aesthetics should take them into account when it
is concerned with those mental phenomena. Accordingly, it is to be ex-
pected that philosophers interested, say, in pictorial experience should not
only engage in philosophy of mind and, especially, philosophy of percep-
tion, but also have at least a serious look at what cognitive psychology
has to say (or not to say) about this kind of experience. The question of
whether empirical research is relevant for aesthetics, however, reduces in
such cases largely to the question of whether it is relevant for the more
basic philosophical discipline.
The topic of aesthetic value and of aesthetic evaluation seems to be dif-
ferent. At least, there is no well-established philosophy of normativity —
that is, of norms, reasons and values in general, independently of particular
types of them — which the debate about this topic should or could refer
to. Hence, even if the issue of whether empirical ﬁndings are relevant for
aesthetic evaluation is in fact just a special case of the more general issue
of whether such ﬁndings are relevant for evaluation (or at least objective
evaluation), we may for the time being address it more directly, that is,
from within aesthetics.
Another, and perhaps related, difference is that, while phenomena like
repeatable  artefacts, pictorial  experience or  psychological  engagement
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with stories are not distinctively aesthetic, aesthetic evaluation is. We may
be confronted with abstract individuals, experience pictures or respond to
stories in non-aesthetic contexts. Laws and sounds possess arguably the
same ontological status as novels or pieces of music (Thomasson, 1999),
but typically not the same aesthetic status. We experience traffic or emer-
gency exit signs as depictions, without the resulting experience counting
as an aesthetic experience. And something similar is perhaps also true of
the emotional and imaginative engagement of members of a nation with
some nation-deﬁning myth (e.g., that of Wilhelm Tell). But the (seeming)
recognition of the aesthetic value of something already suffices to establish
an aesthetic context.2
In this essay, I intend to concentrate on the issue to which extent the
results of empirical investigations may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation.
The latter ﬁgures in aesthetics in at least two different ways. It may be
the topic of investigation, or it may instead be the aim of investigation.
In the ﬁrst case, we are concerned with philosophical aesthetics and, more
precisely, the philosophical debate about how best to account for aesthetic
value and aesthetic appreciation. In the second case, we are concerned
with critical aesthetics and, more precisely, the aesthetic assessment of a
particular object or type of object. Philosophy and criticism do not differ
merely in the generality of what they are about (e.g., all vs. some instances
of aesthetic value). They also differ in how they approach the issue of
aesthetic evaluation — in whether they investigate the nature of aesthetic
value or, alternatively, the aesthetic nature of objects.
Empirical ﬁndings may be relevant for one or both forms of aesthetics;
and they may be relevant for them in different ways. Within criticism,
they may inﬂuence how we assess particular objects, or types of objects;
and whithin philosophy, they may inﬂuence which account of aesthetic
value and evaluation we prefer. My concern is with their relevance for
the respective goals of aesthetics — that is, to which extent (if any) they
should inﬂuence which account of aesthetic value and evaluation we pre-
fer, and which aesthetic values we ascribe to particular (types of) entities.
That they sometimes do inﬂuence our philosophical or critical activities
is probably a truism, and not a particularly interesting one, for that mat-
ter. But whether they should do so is controversial and, moreover, very
2 This indicates that what ultimately delineates the subject area of aesthetics is aes-
thetic value — just as what delineates the subject area of moral philosophy is moral value.
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important for the development of our philosophical and critical practices.
Philosophers who ask whether empirical ﬁndings are relevant for the
aesthetic assessment of objects are typically not concerned with the issue
of whether our personal experiences of the works are relevant. Something
similar is true, say, of art-historical or scientiﬁc studies limited to the par-
ticular artworks (like the dating of a painting, or X-ray pictures of it). In-
stead, the focus of attention is normally on more general and systematic
scientiﬁc investigations — for instance, concerning the evolution of artis-
tic practices or our psychological reactions to art. However — with the
possible exception of our engagement with conceptual art or, more gener-
ally, ideas and theories — both our aesthetic experiences of artworks and
our art-historical studies are clearly empirical in nature. That is, they are
empirical — and not apriori — sources of knowledge. I brieﬂy return to
this aspect of aesthetic experience at the end of this essay. Until then, I
partly follow tradition in restricting my discussion to empirical ﬁndings in
a narrower sense, which excludes our own perception- and sensation-based
experiences, but includes concrete art-historical and scientiﬁc knowledge
about particular artworks.
2. Critical Aesthetics
Critical aesthetics is concerned with the aesthetic assessment of particular
objects or types of objects. The appreciation of a single artwork is not
the only — and perhaps even not the standard — example of criticism.
We also evaluate groups of artworks in respect of the fact, say, that they
belong to the same artist, period, style or genre. In addition, the objects of
assessment need not be artistic or even artefacts. But I limit my discussion
here to aesthetic criticism of artworks.
The latter may involve many different cognitive or active elements.
First of all, its goal is not merely to identify the aesthetic value of the
objects concerned, but also to make sense of this value in terms of their
other, less evaluative features. It is sometimes fairly easy to come to know
whether something is an aesthetically good or bad work, but typically
much more difficult to understand why this is so. This is reﬂected in a
peculiar aspect of aesthetic evaluation — the fact that, in aesthetic mat-
ters, we should rely on our own experiences, rather than on the testimony
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of others.3 Of course, we can come to know about the value of an object
through listening to the opinions of others: we can come to know that it
has this or that value. But even the best descriptions can rarely — if ever
— give us sufficient access to how the object in question realises its value.
Masterpieces have in common their aesthetic excellence. But they manage
to be masterpieces in very different ways, rendering them very particular
— or ‘unique’ — artworks. Moreover, what interests us is not always, or
merely, the positive or negative aesthetic value of an object, but its spe-
ciﬁc realisation of that value. We would spend far less time with artworks
if they would all be beautiful, say, in the very same way. Aesthetic criti-
cism may differ in this respect from moral criticism, given that the latter
seems to focus more (though also not exclusively) on the morality of the
actions or persons concerned.
Another important element of criticism is that it involves the presenta-
tion and consideration of reasons for evaluation (e.g., reasons for admiring
something, or for judging it to be a masterpiece). Part of our interest in
the features which help to realise aesthetic value is that we can point to
them in rational defense of our assessments. That we feel the need to do
so, and demand of others to back up their evaluations as well, reﬂects the
claim to objectivity inherent to aesthetic evaluation. We do not just let
disagreements exist, we try to resolve them, partly because we assume in
our own assessments that they are right, and all opposing ones wrong. Ac-
cordingly, the vindication of aesthetic evaluations has also the purpose to
help others to recognise our perspective on the relevant features and their
relationship to aesthetic worth. The understanding of why something has
a certain aesthetic value is therefore not merely metaphysical, but also ra-
tional. Its object of knowledge are the properties of the object and their
relations of realisation. But they are known in such a way that it becomes
intelligible for us why it has the aesthetic value in question. The rational
aspect explains, for instance, why we are not curious about all metaphys-
ical facts about artworks when considering them from an aesthetic point
of view. The nature and distribution of the molecules of a painting are
presumably sufficient for its possession of a certain aesthetic value. But
we are not interested in its molecular structure because it does not help
us to make sense of the worth of the painting and, hence, to defend our
3 See discussions about the principle of acquaintance (e.g., Budd, 2003) and the au-
tonomy of aesthetic evaluations (e.g., Hopkins, 2001).
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assessment when challenged to do so by others (cf. Dorsch, 2013).
2.1. The Normativity of Aesthetic Evaluation
Although criticism may very well involve other elements over and above
evaluation and metaphysical and rational understanding, the latter are cen-
tral to it, and I intend to concentrate exclusively on them. Empirical ﬁnd-
ings can possibly contribute to evaluation and understanding by identify-
ing: (i) the value of the objects concerned; (ii) their other features; (iii)
the relation of realisation between the features and the value; and (iv) the
relation of intelligibility between the features and the value.4 It seems in-
dubitable that we have empirical access to the relevant other features of
aesthetically valuable objects. We can see their colours and shapes, un-
derstand what they represent, come to learn about their history, or dis-
cover their hidden material features. But knowledge of them alone does
not suffice for knowledge of the aesthetic values at issue. What is needed
in addition is the recognition that the features realise a speciﬁc aesthetic
value or, alternatively, that they provide good reason for the ascription of
such a value.
This explains why it is not enough, say, to investigate the aesthetic
preferences of people, or their tendencies to form certain aesthetic judge-
ments. What any corresponding studies track is what people value, and
not what is valuable. The recognition of the true values of objects requires
also the ability to tell which of the noted evaluations are adequate. We can
tell whether an evaluation is adequate in two ways: by considering the rea-
sons for preferring it over other evaluations and then forming a rational
conclusion about whether it is best supported; or by investigating the rel-
evant features of the object and checking whether the evaluation assigns
to it the value which the features realise. For both options, it is neces-
sary to recognise the features concerned. But while the ﬁrst treats them
as reasons, the second treats them as realisators.
Consider the — rather loose — analogy with colours. Colour experi-
ence is not based on, or responsive to, reasons. But it still allows for a very
similar dichotomy of methods. On the one hand, we may be able to tell
whether a given colour experience is adequate by looking at the conditions
4 Perhaps it is not the features, but our experiences of them, which constitute the
reasons. For the sake of simplicity, I assume here that the former is the case. Nothing in
what follows should depend on this assumption.
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under which it occurs — notably the illumination conditions and the state
of mind of the person concerned. The thought is that sufficiently good
conditions suggest adequacy. On the other hand, coming to know the re-
ﬂectance proﬁle of a surface enables us to predict its colour — assuming
that the latter is relativised to normal human beings and may not be prop-
erly perceived under suboptimal conditions (cf. Byrne and Hilbert, 2003).
It is true that reﬂectance proﬁles may not be able to ﬁx all qualitative as-
pects of colour, such as the location of unique hues (cf. Allen, 2010) or the
colour similarities across surface, volume and light colours (cf. Dorsch,
2010). But they suffice to determine the shade of colour to a very high de-
gree. Hence, we can come to know about very (if not most) speciﬁc colours
by means of carrying out relevant experiments in optical physics. So we
have an independent route to the truth-value of a given colour experience.
When applied to aesthetic evaluation, the equivalent of the ﬁrst option
is to discover the rational relations which the relevant features of the ob-
ject bear to its value. This means that we recognise the features as speaking
in favour of a certain evaluation, rather than others. So the identiﬁcation
of the aesthetic value would ultimately amount to the identiﬁcation of
other features as aesthetic reasons. I return to this option in a moment.
Before that, it is helpful to see why the second option is not appicable
to the aesthetic case. The main reason for this is that we normally do
not possess knowledge about which aesthetic value a set of given features
does, or is likely to, realise (see the relevant well-known essays in Sibley,
2001). While we can deduce the colour of an object from its other features
(e.g., its reﬂectance proﬁle), we cannot do the same with the beauty of an
artwork.5 That is, we cannot bridge the gap from knowledge of the other
features of an object to knowledge of its aesthetic value. We simply lack
the required principles of inference.
What is important to note here is that the recognition of the features
as reasons makes all the difference. Once we become aware of the fact
that the features speak in favour of certain evaluations, we can balance the
resulting reasons and endorse the assessment which they overall support.
This is possible because of two differences between treating the features
5 The only exception is perhaps that, if we know that a given artwork shares all its
other features with another work, this suffices to conclude that it also possesses the same
aesthetic value. But the corresponding principles are too concrete to be of any interesting
practical use. And it is also not clear whether they should count as genuine principles in
the ﬁrst place (cf. Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, 2004).
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as realisators and treating them as reasons.
First, the former focusses on the metaphysical relation between the fea-
tures and the aesthetic values, hence requiring knowledge of the laws gov-
erning this kind of realisation in order to ascribe the realised property on
the basis of recognising the realising features. We need to know, say, which
reﬂectance proﬁles are nomologically linked to which hues if we want to
tell the colour of an object on the basis of discovering its reﬂectance prop-
erties. By contrast, the latter treatment concentrates on the rational (and
epistemic) connections among the experiences of the various features con-
cerned. All we need to be able to come to a rational conclusion about the
aesthetic value of an object is to be rational and to recognise the features as
reasons. Noticing that the elegance of an outline drawing of a face speaks
strongly in favour of a positive evaluation, while its overemphasized real-
ism supports a slightly negative assessment, it may be reasonable to judge
that the drawing is somewhat beautiful.
Second, in contrast to following the route involving metaphysical know-
ledge, following the route involving rational balancing need not rely on
principles involving the overall value of objects. It does not proceed de-
ductively; and the forms of inference involved are typically not governed
by principles — or at least not to a very large extent. When judging the
number of participants in a demonstration, we may perhaps be able to start
with the knowledge that it is higher than one hundred, and lower than one
thousand. For a more precise informed guess, we have to rely on our var-
ious impressions of the mass of people in front of us (e.g., when we look
at it from different angles), without the need for, or availability of, princi-
ples. Something very similar may happen when we experience an artwork
and come to know its aesthetic worth by considering the rational force
of its features. Our different impressions pull us in different directions.
But reaching an equilibrium among them does not presuppose reliance on
principles linking the features to the respective value.
It is perhaps possible to formulate — possibly hedged — principles
which describe the contribution of particular features to the aesthetic
value of an object — such as the principle that, everything else being equal,
something elegant is beautiful, or the principle that something symmet-
rical possesses a positive aesthetic value (e.g., that of being balanced or
harmonious). But empirical studies have difficulties to help us to discover
or apply such principles. One particular problem is that, even if it turns
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out that a certain aesthetic value is always coextensional with a speciﬁc set
of other features, this does not suffice to show that the objects concerned
possess the value in virtue of instantiating those features. For instance, the
opposite may be true; or the two kinds of property may be due to some
third aspect of the objects at issue. Whether the features indeed realise
the aesthetic value is, again, a matter of whether we can make sense of the
presence of the latter in terms of the presence of the former. And this is
for criticism to decide, and not for science.
Moreover, there is the problem that many aesthetic principles may only
be valid in a hedged form — that is, relative to other things being equal.
This raises the further question of when to apply these principles. Their
adequate application presupposes the recognition of when things are in
fact equal. This is, in particular, the case if the object does not possess
any other aesthetically relevant features which outweigh or undermine
the evaluative contribution of the features initially considered. But there
is often no limit to the number of such potential competitors. An ele-
gantly drawn line may none the less be ugly for very different reasons —
for instance, because of its colour scheme, aspects of the drawn ﬁgures, its
background, or indeed its format. Empirical investigations can tell us that
certain of these competitors are absent. But they cannot do so for all of
them, assuming that the potentially defective colour schemes, drawn as-
pects, backgrounds or formats cannot easily be restricted to a ﬁnite num-
ber.
Accordingly, empirical ﬁndings cannot contribute much to the identi-
ﬁcation of reasons (rather than what we take to be reasons), nor to the
explanation of how these reasons render the attribution of speciﬁc aes-
thetic values intelligible, given that both tasks are essentially concerned
with intelligibility (or normativity). At best, they may help us to notice
features of objects which we then recognise as reasons. Hence, recognis-
ing which features are aesthetically relevant, and how they are relevant,
requires more than empirical studies: it requires rational aesthetic experi-
ence.6
6 Whether the recognition of particular features as speaking for or against particular
evaluations is underwritten by principles is an independent issue.
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2.2. The Concreteness of Aesthetic Evaluation
But their normative dimension is not the only aspect of aesthetic evalua-
tions which poses a serious problem for an empirical approach to aesthetic
value. Another one is their concreteness, which becomes manifest in two
facts. The ﬁrst is that relatively small qualitative details may matter for
the aesthetic value of an object. A slight dent in a line may undermine its
elegance and, hence, the positive value of the respective simple line draw-
ing. The second aspect of the concreteness of aesthetic evaluations is that
not only the qualities, but also the particularity of objects may matter for
their aesthetic worth. This may happen, for instance, in cases where the
particularity of artistic expression becomes relevant. Artworks may be ex-
pressive of perspectives onto the world. That is, they may represent the
values, emotions and opinions of (real or ﬁctional) persons or characters.
But, more fundamentally, they are expressions of the skills of the respec-
tive artist — of his or her insight, inventiveness, wit, sensibility, unorigi-
nality or dilentatism. Part of why we value certain artworks may be that
they are expressive of the speciﬁc skills of a certain artist. And appreci-
ating artistic expression may require taking into account the particularity
of the artist and his or her act of expression. For instance, it may matter
whether a given Cubistic painting was made by Braque or Picasso.
Empirical research, however, is typically not concerned with particu-
larity. Moreover, it can capture speciﬁc details only in exchange for gen-
erality. Studying the nature and context of an individual painting, say, by
means of speciﬁc material or art-historical investigations (the former, for
instance, involving X-rays or chemical analyses) may indeed help us to no-
tice relevant facts about the painting. We may, for instance, discover the
gesture which the depicted heroine was originally painted as making, and
this may help us to better understand the meaning of the ultimately de-
picted gestures. But taking the concreteness of the painting into account
in this way has the consequence that the observed results cannot be (easily)
generalised to other paintings or artworks.
3. Philosophical Aesthetics
When shifting attention from critical aesthetics to philosophical aesthet-
ics, it is perhaps more plausible to expect that empirical ﬁndings do be-
come relevant — not the least because philosophy — in contrast with
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criticism — is essentially concerned with general issues about aesthetic
value. The following discussion concentrates on two particular attempts
to establish the relevance of empirical aesthetics, namely by explaining our
general aesthetic interests and sensibilities in evolutionary terms, and by
showing that our aesthetic evaluations are heavily inﬂuenced by factors
which more traditional theories of aesthetic value take to be irrelevant for
— or even detrimental to — aesthetic appreciation.
Such empirical insights and considerations may supplement our exist-
ing philosophical accounts of aesthetic evaluation; or they may require a
substantial revision of them. In what follows, I aim to show that the latter
is much more difficult to establish than the former. But before entering
the details of the discussion, it is worthwhile to stress that any revision-
ary consequences of empirical research for philosophy may also have an
impact on criticism. If we are to change our general conception of what
aesthetic value amounts to and how aesthetic evaluation should work, we
also are to change the way in which we approach particular objects of aes-
thetic evaluation and assess them aesthetically. If we were wrong, for in-
stance, to take aesthetic evaluation to be a rational phenomenon, then we
should stop to assign such an important role to reasons and reasoning when
evaluating speciﬁc artworks. And if it turns out that our appreciation of
aesthetic skills ultimately amounts to an appreciation of skills favourable
for survival or procreation, then we should perhaps treat artistic creation
as much more mundane than we usually do (e.g., as on a par with other
human achievements, such as those in sport or economy).
3.1. Evolutionary Accounts of Artistic Practices
Some evolutionary psychologists have indeed argued that our interest in
creating and appreciating art derives from sexual selection (cf. Miller,
2000; see also Dutton, 2003 and Currie, 2005). While it is perhaps dif-
ﬁcult to understand the creation and appreciation of art as an important
factor for the survival of a species or particular members of it (with the
possible exception of monetary issues), it does not seem unreasonable to
explain the occurrence of artistic practices in terms of their role in the
selection of suitable mating partners. Art displays the skills of the artist,
such as creativity, intelligence, insight, empathy or perseverance. Some
— if not all — of these skills are important in a relationship aimed at the
successful upbringing of offspring. Moreover, art is a reliable indicator of
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their presence, given that it is not easy to create (what looks like) good art.
Finally, the creation of art is very resourceful, suggesting that the artist
has more than enough energy and skill to support himself: he has time
for leisure and for producing seemingly useless things.7 The tail of a pea-
cock is an obstacle in its survival: it is difficult to carry around and attracts
potential predators. So it is very impressive if a peacock with a large tail
manages to survive and to parade (cf. Am. Zahavi and An. Zahavi, 1997).
Similarly, the appreciation of art — while taking up some resources on its
own — is worthwhile since it increases the chance to ﬁnd a mate of high
quality with respect to procreation.
Considerations like these may very well explain why early humanity
started to engage in artistic practices. But empirical facts about the ori-
gin of our current practices, however, do not automatically render those
practices intelligible.8
First of all, the origin of a practice may be completely extrinsic to its
contemporary signiﬁcance for our lives. In many cases, we start to en-
gage in a practice for reasons which do not speak in favour of pursuing
the practice itself, but instead are concerned with some contingent conse-
quences that this pursuit is likely to have. We want to be near and impress
people (e.g., when we love them), please them or follow their role-model
(e.g., when they are our parents), or present ourselves in a favourable light
(e.g., when they are our boss, or some other ﬁgure with authority). Such
motivations may lead us to go to the opera, attend all football games of a
certain team, visit church regularly, or join others for a drink after work,
without us taking enjoyment in those activities as such. But over time,
it may happen that those practices become valuable for us in themselves,
and we would continue to engage in them, even if our original motivations
disappear.
Some such practices did not start with us, but with our ancestors. They
changed religion, for instance, because of outside pressure. And this may
explain, in a historical (or causal) sense, why we have been attending mass
from our early childhood onwards. It may indeed also shed light on why
7 The situation changes, of course, once the creation of art becomes itself a means for
survival — for instance, as a source of income. But this just strengthens the claim that
what matters in our engagement with art is that it helps us to reach our evolutionarily
determined goals.
8 What becomes crucial here is perhaps the difference between history and genealogy
(cf. Williams, 2002).
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this ritual is important for us nowadays — for instance, when we continue
to adhere to it as a manifestation of our sense of tradition or cultural con-
servatism. But this is not necessarily so. In fact, it may actually be the case
that the practice is signiﬁcant for us despite its history. Perhaps, for us, re-
ligion should never be a matter of tradition, but only of personal decision
and faith.
Of course, the case of the evolutionary origin is different in that it con-
cerns, at least to a large extent, factors beyond our own control or the
control of cultural groups. But this does not prevent them from possibly
becoming relatively irrelevant for our current practices. Indeed, it may
render them even more removed from the latter. It is not easy to conceive
of a way of making sense of the many different aspects of our evaluative
engagement with art in terms of sexual selection, say. We have a fairly
good understanding of the various reasons why people devote their lives
to the creation of artworks — the need for self-expression, the challenge
and satisfaction coming with creation, the simultaneity of the playfulness
and the seriousness of art, the search for fame and wealth, and so on. Sim-
ilarly, people spend time on experiencing art for very different reasons —
such as curiosity about the human condition, more speciﬁc historical and
art-historical interests, the search for real value and intellectual compan-
ionship, the need for entertainment or distraction, considerations about
social status, and so on. Many of these motivations for actively or passively
engaging with art are not easily linked to, or explained by, sexual selection.
Moreover, the motivations also differ greatly from case to case. Artists
have very personal and particular reasons for producing art, and part of the
value of their works may precisely be due to the fact that this speciﬁcity is
reﬂected in them. Something similar is true of spectators who are sensi-
tive of the concreteness of art and the artists, but typically not before the
background of a personal interest in the artist as a potential candidate for
mating (especially if the artist lived in the past). Of course, such an interest
may still always be effective in some unconscious or subpersonal manner
— as, perhaps, some psychoanalytic theories might claim. But to estab-
lish such a claim would require the collection of much more empirical data
about what actually moves us to engage with art and would therefore go
far beyond evolutionary psychology. And which data is relevant depends
on whether it helps us to make sense of our current practices, or at least
sheds new light on them — but from an aesthetic, and not merely from a
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biological point of view.
Besides, the insights of evolutionary psychology about our artistic prac-
tices cannot easily be transferred to aesthetic criticism. It is one thing to
explain why people want to play football, but a completely different thing
to judge when they play football well. Similarly, even if we have convinc-
ing explanation of why we engage in our current artistic practices, it is far
from clear why this explanation should have any bearing on how we assess
the aesthetic worth of the artworks involved in those practices. Even if
we admire a certain painting because it reveals the painter as a very skilled
person who would be ideal for procreation, this does not suffice to estab-
lish that the artwork is of high aesthetic value — many other activities and
their products can manifest skill and expertise to a similar extent.9
3.2. The Rationality of Aesthetic Appreciation
One of the main problems with the conclusions of evolutionary psycholo-
gists has been that accounts of past developments cannot be easily applied
to the present. Many other — and typically more conﬁned — empirical
studies avoid this difficulty by focussing on our current engagement with
artworks or similar objects of aesthetic experience. For instance, some
ﬁndings suggest that we tend to like wine more if we take it to be relatively
expensive — even if we can claim some considerable expertise in matters
of wine (cf. Plassmann et al., 2008). Others indicate that our experience
of a wine is heavily inﬂuenced by whether we take the wine (rightly or
wrongly) to be white or red (cf. Brochet, 2001). And, again, others illus-
trate that we prefer certain Impressionist paintings over others relative to
our — possibly unknown — familiarity with them (cf. Cutting, 2006).10
To start with the last example, it cannot be so easily concluded that
familiarity tends to lead only to positive aesthetic evaluations. As far as I
can tell, the studies were done with relatively unknown, but aesthetically
valuable Impressionist paintings. Thus, it still has to be seen whether the
experiments would have the same results if other genres and, especially,
9 Interestingly, contemporary artists rarely have the image of being potentially suc-
cessful parents, even assuming that they are rich and that what matters is solely the num-
ber of healthy offspring they and the following generations are likely to produce. Several
explanations suggest themselves, such as changes towards an individualistic way of living,
or the felt need to concetrate all time and energy on the art itself.
10 I am largely following the description of these studies in Kieran, 2010.
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really bad paintings would be used. It is less obvious whether the studies
about the impact of beliefs about the price of wine face the same prob-
lem. But it is at least imaginable that a seemingly high price may have the
opposite effect — for instance, the critic in question may judge the wine
to be not very good and, hence, to be heavily overpriced, perhaps further
strengthening his negative attitude towards the wine. Besides, it is also
not clear how, say, well-informed art-historians would respond to knowl-
edge about the price of paintings when aiming to carefully determine the
aesthetic worth of the latter.
Then, that our assessments of Impressionist paintings tend to be more
positive if we are more familiar with them should not be surprising. After
all, familiarity is a condition on proper aesthetic evaluation and, in partic-
ular, on the recognition of aesthetic worth. It often takes time to be able
to see the real value of an artwork. And this is not less true of genres or
kinds of artworks which people are generally more exposed to — say, for
reasons of fashion, or due to the fact that the art concerned is (presum-
ably wrongly) now perceived as having lost its revolutionary or provocative
status. It may be pointed out that the subjects concerned (i.e., students
listening to introductory lectures in psychology, with the paintings serving
as backgrounds for the presented slides) did not look at the paintings —
and did not familiarise themselves with them — with the aim to appreciate
them as artworks. Hence, their familiarity with the paintings may be of
a rather different kind than the one presupposed by proper aesthetic as-
sessment. But then, their resulting preferences should count as defective
from an aesthetic point of view — either because they are not aesthetic
at all due to a lack of claim to objectivity, or because they fail to live up
to that claim inherent in aesthetic evaluation. The same seems true of
cases in which beliefs about the ﬁnancial value of objects inﬂuence our
aesthetic assessments of them — the latter should minimally count as de-
fective. This is actually one reason why, even if it is indeed the case that
price or familiarity inﬂuence our preferences in a biased manner, this does
not undermine accounts of aesthetic value which stress the objectivity and
rationality of aesthetic criticism.
Another reason is that some of the studies test our emotional prefer-
ences, rather than our rational assessments of objects. Pleasure or prefer-
ence — that is, what we like — is surely open to irrational factors. But, as
I have argued elsewhere (Dorsch, 2007), this is precisely why we should be
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rather wary when relying on our emotional feelings for the evaluation of
objects.11 There is no problem in ascribing values on the basis of emotions
(or similar states, such as desires) — as long as we clearly acknowledge that
the ascribed values are subjective and do not necessarily reﬂect how the
objects should be assessed from a more objective point of view. If we are
instead concerned with the discovery of the objective value of an object,
emotions are not our best guides and, in fact, may often mislead us. They
may be very successful in drawing our attention to the positive or negative
values of objects, as well as to their other features which help to realise
those values. But due to their openness to irrational factors, we need to
rely on reason to check their reliability.
Of course, we are very good at coming up with invented rationalisations
of our aesthetic judgements. And whether we recognise certain features of
an artwork as a reason to ascribe to them a certain aesthetic value may also
be open to inﬂuence from aesthetically irrelevant factors, such as familiar-
ity or price. But we can, at least to a considerable extent, overcome these
obstacles, say, by listening to the assessments and justiﬁcations of others.
We should perhaps not simply take over their opinions. But we should at
least use them to question the epistemic standing of our own views and to
reconsider our reasons for endorsing the latter. Empirical studies — like
the one’s mentioned — may in fact play a similar role to such testimony.
While they cannot tell us what aesthetic value is or how we should ascribe
it to particular objects, they may help us to recognise that our aesthetic
judgements are easily inﬂuenced by factors that ideally should have had
no bearing. In other words, empirical evidence may show us that certain
of our aesthetic evaluations are not of good aesthetic standing (or even
not aesthetic in the ﬁrst place). But it cannot weaken those standards, or
replace them with new ones.
It might be suggested that such investigations actually show that we are
never really able to live up to this ideal and form proper aesthetic judge-
ments. But this form of scepticism seems to be too strong. First, the
studies are typically concerned with situations in which the subjects are
ignorant about some very important facts about the objects concerned.
That people get misled when assessing a white wine which they take to
be red does not show that they get misled in the same way when assess-
11 Compare also Goldie, 2004’s view that emotions do not ground evaluations, but
instead are themselves partly grounded by reasons for evaluation.
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ing a red wine which they take to be red. In the ﬁrst case, they go wrong
precisely because they miscategorise the object concerned. But they do
so in good faith and are not to be blamed for their mistake. After all,
the perceptual evidence is striking, and the experimentators seem to be
trustworthy to them. Hence, in the second case in which they categorise
the wine correctly, it is not to be expected that their categorisation will
give rise to any error in their aesthetic appreciation. And second, criticism
does not differ in this respect from physics, say. Truth in the sciences (with
the possible exception of mathematics) is typically only approximate (cf.
Oddie, 1986). It may be easy to falsify a theory, but perhaps impossible to
verify it. So we should not expect criticism to fare better in this respect,
especially since aesthetic truths seem to be more elusive than scientiﬁc
ones — partly because they are so closely linked to our ﬁrst-personal per-
spective onto the world (as illustrated, for instance, by the principle of
acquaintance). What the empirical studies at best illustrate is that it is
difficult and time-consuming to come to a proper aesthetic assessment of
a particular object.
4. Conclusion
The preceding considerations were meant to show that — and also begin
to explain why — the relevance of the results of empirical studies of various
kinds for both the criticism of artworks and the philosophy of aesthetic
value is limited. Concerning criticism, the normativity of aesthetic evalua-
tions has the consequence that scientiﬁc investigations can at best help us
to notice features of artworks, which we can then independently recognise
as aesthetically relevant; while the concreteness of aesthetic evaluations
has the consequence that empirical studies either miss their particular tar-
get completely, or shed light on it only in a very speciﬁc way, without the
possibility for meaningful generalisations. Moreover, making sense of the
aesthetic worth of objects in terms of their other features requires non-
empirical rational considerations. Concerning philosophy, on the other
hand, empirical ﬁndings may perhaps bring us to reconsider our accounts
of aesthetic value and its application to particular artworks. But neither
considerations about the evolution of artistic practices, nor facts about
our emotional and evaluative responses to artworks require us to develop
more empiricist views on what aesthetic value is and how we should go
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about ascribing it. Again, the rationality of aesthetic evaluations and the
concreteness of our motivations for engaging with art are partly responsi-
ble for this facts: neither can be easily tested or illuminated by empirical
means.
Returning to the issue of aesthetic criticism, the same limitations do
not pertain to our ﬁrst-hand and ﬁrst-personal experiences of artworks,
despite their empirical character. They concern particular objects and
provide us with reasons; and they enable us to make sense of the aesthetic
value of objects. This appears to suggest that there is a fundamental di-
vide among our empirical ways of accessing artworks. One hypothesis is
that any more indirect or third-personal evidence becomes relevant for the
aesthetic evaluation of speciﬁc works only if it is integrated with our more
basic aesthetic experiences of them — for instance, when art-historical
facts concern the particular object in question, or psychological evidence
is focussed on our speciﬁc response. That is, the third-personally gained
empirical results may supplement our aesthetic experiences in that they
point us to features which make it intelligible why the objects concern
possess their aesthetic values. By contrast, other, more general kinds of
third-personal ﬁndings may just bring us to question our considered views
about the values of objects or the nature of those values. The so-called
‘test of time’ may perhaps serve as an illustration of this condition on the
relevance of empirical evidence. Part of the explanation of why objects
survive this test is that people (whether they are experienced critics or or-
dinary lay people) continue over the centuries and cultures to care about
their preservation for aesthetic reasons (and not merely for ﬁnancial or
other reasons). So the survival of a given artwork provides us with empir-
ical evidence — though, it seems, not (as Hume may have hoped) about
its aesthetic value, but instead about the more general quality of our own
evaluation of it. Having previously failed to appreciate Homer’s Ulyssess,
realising what it means for it to have survived the centuries may still bring
us to reconsider its aesthetic quality and perhaps to recognise its proper
worth.
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